MigrationInterpretation

Martin Ruhs's The Price of Rights explained: migrant workers' rights, openness and the trade-off

Ruhs measured labour migration in 46 countries: more rights tend to mean fewer doors. Which rights he would never touch, and what it means for Spain.

Comic illustration: on the harbour quay, Theo points with a book and Lucía lifts a ledger beside a balance scale standing on a mooring bollard, with an open gate in one pan, a small house in the other and a gold pivot at the centre.

In short

In The Price of Rights (Princeton University Press, 2013), Martin Ruhs shows that high-income countries trade openness to lower-skilled migrant workers against some of the rights those workers get after admission, mainly social, residence and family rights. He accepts temporary, evidence-based limits on four rights (free choice of employment, means-tested benefits, family reunion, and permanent residence and citizenship) for about four years, inside a universal core of rights that includes equal pay and working conditions. For Spain and the EU, the radical-centre reading is to publish, channel by channel, which rights each permit carries and when they grow, so openness and rights are decided together and in public.

Key points

  • Martin Ruhs's The Price of Rights (Princeton University Press, 2013) built two indexes, one of openness and one of migrant rights, for labour immigration programmes in 46 high- and middle-income countries, Spain among them.
  • Programmes for higher-skilled workers are more open and grant more rights; among upper-high-income countries, more openness to admitting migrants goes with fewer of a few specific rights, mostly social, residence and family rights.
  • Ruhs would accept temporary limits, for about four years, on free choice of employment, means-tested benefits, family reunion, and permanent residence and citizenship, and only with transparency and a free exit for the worker.
  • EU law already sorts rights by channel: the recast Single Permit Directive (EU) 2024/1233 sets an equal-treatment floor and lets workers change employer, while the EU Blue Card gives the highly skilled fast-track family reunification and easier mobility.
  • The radical-centre reading for Spain: one public table per channel saying which rights each permit carries from day one and when the rest arrive.

Martin Ruhs wrote The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration (Princeton University Press, 2013) while he was at Oxford, at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. He now teaches at the European University Institute in Florence and is deputy director of its Migration Policy Centre. The book won the American Political Science Association's 2014 best book award in migration and citizenship,.

Our piece on a state in control of immigration used the book's headline finding to argue for a yearly migration plan voted in the Cortes. This one goes inside the book: how Ruhs measured the trade-off, which rights he would let a state restrict, which ones he would never touch, and what that looks like with the EU directives Spain applies today.

How Ruhs measured the trade-off

Ruhs starts from a puzzle. The UN convention on the rights of migrant workers, adopted in 1990, has been ratified by fewer than fifty countries, mostly countries that send migrants, which makes it the least ratified of the major human rights treaties. Rich countries sign general human rights treaties and then decline the one that would limit what they can do with migrant workers' rights. His explanation is plain: rights have effects. Whether a worker can change jobs shapes productivity, wages and competition with local workers. Access to welfare shapes the fiscal balance. A path to permanent residence changes how much people invest in the language and in skills. So every labour immigration policy really makes three decisions at once: how many to admit, whom to select, and what rights they get after they arrive.

From there he sets three hypotheses. Rich countries are more open to high-skilled than to low-skilled workers. Programmes for the highly skilled grant more rights. And for some rights of some workers, openness and rights pull against each other. To test them he built two indexes from scratch, one for the openness of labour immigration programmes and one for the legal rights they grant (civil and political, economic, social, residence and family reunion), covering 46 high- and middle-income countries. Spain is in the sample, as his presentation of the book at COMPAS shows, alongside most of western Europe, North America, the Gulf and East Asia.

The data back all three. Programmes aimed at higher-skilled workers are more open and give more rights. Economic and political rights vary little with skill; social, residence and family rights vary a lot. Among upper-high-income countries, more open programmes go with fewer of a handful of specific rights, usually selected economic and social rights plus residence and family reunion. The trade-off mostly disappears in programmes for the most highly skilled, because countries compete for those workers. Ruhs is careful to say he is measuring rights on paper, in law, for legally admitted workers. Irregular migration sits outside the book; his later EU-funded PRIME project took it on.

Then he looks at the other side of the deal. Migrants weigh it every day: large numbers accept restricted rights in exchange for work at higher wages, and Ruhs treats that choice as constrained but real. Sending countries weigh it too. His European example is sharp: when older EU members insisted that posted workers from the new eastern member states be employed on exactly the same terms as their own citizens, several of those new members called it protectionism that cancelled their cheaper-labour advantage.

What he would restrict, and what he would never touch

The normative chapter is where Ruhs is most specific, and where the reviews push back. He argues for new and bigger temporary programmes, especially for lower-skilled workers, who gain most from working abroad and face the tightest doors. Inside those programmes he would tolerate restricting four rights: free choice of employment, equal access to means-tested benefits, family reunion, and the right to permanent residence and citizenship. Each restriction has to rest on evidence of a specific cost that, once removed, lets the country admit more people. Each lasts for a limited period, about four years. After that the worker gets a path to permanent residence and eventually citizenship, or leaves. And the whole arrangement needs transparent rules and a guaranteed freedom for the worker to quit the programme whenever they choose.

Peter Mares, reviewing the book for Inside Story, spelled out the core Ruhs leaves untouched: freedom of thought, expression, religion and association, and equal pay and working conditions, which also protect local workers. The limit on changing jobs would tie a worker to a sector or occupation and leave them free to switch employer within it, because being bound to one boss is where exploitation starts. Mares found the four-year figure under-argued, and he also found the ethical case hard to dismiss. Ruhs's sharpest point is aimed at rights advocates: rights campaigns that defend only migrants already here forget the much larger number of people still at home who want a legal job abroad. He calls for a reframed rights-based approach, and asks human rights advocates to lead the debate about which restrictions are worth it.

Reading Spain and the EU through Ruhs

Europe has already written part of Ruhs's design into law. The recast Single Permit Directive, (EU) 2024/1233, which member states had to transpose by 21 May 2026, gives third-country workers equal treatment with nationals on pay, dismissal, hours, leave, health and safety, on strikes and union membership, and on education and training. It lets a permit holder change employer, while allowing states to require notification, a labour market check or a minimum spell with the first employer. Unemployment does not cost the permit for up to three months, or six after two years. That is Ruhs's universal core plus a time-limited, sector-style restriction, written in a directive. The EU Blue Card shows his second hypothesis at work: highly qualified workers get fast-track family reunification, a move to a second member state after twelve months and simpler access to long-term residence.

Spain's seasonal programme is the clearest Ruhs case at home. In 2025, the government's own figures put it at 25,767 workers from 17 countries, 92% of them women, mainly in agriculture, under circular permits that last four years, allow up to nine months' work a year and require a return home after each season, with housing guaranteed by the employer (La Moncloa). Ruhs would recognise the shape and then ask about the renewal. His test says the restricted period ends: after roughly four years a seasonal worker who keeps coming back should be offered a road to settlement, or the arrangement should end.

That is the reading we take for Spain. The left is right that a core of labour rights binds from the first day in every channel, and Spain's labour inspectorate is what makes rights on paper real. The right is right that the state picks numbers and conditions, and that welfare access, family reunion and settlement can be earned on a timetable. Ruhs adds the piece that makes the two fit: put the trade-off on the table. For each channel, from seasonal work to employer-sponsored jobs to the Blue Card, Spain should publish which rights the permit carries on day one, which arrive later and on what date, and how many people it plans to admit. Voters and employers can then argue about the exchange rate between openness and rights in the open, and workers can see exactly what they are signing up to before they travel.

Questions and answers

What is the main argument of The Price of Rights?

Martin Ruhs argues that in high-income countries there is a trade-off between how open labour immigration programmes are and some of the rights migrant workers receive after admission, especially for lower-skilled workers. Insisting on full equality of rights can therefore mean fewer people admitted. He proposes temporary migration programmes that protect a universal core of rights and restrict a few specific rights for a limited time.

Which migrant rights does Martin Ruhs think can be restricted?

In chapter 1 he limits acceptable restrictions to four: free choice of employment, equal access to means-tested public benefits, family reunion, and the right to permanent residence and citizenship. Each restriction must be justified by evidence of a specific cost, last about four years at most, and come with transparent rules and the worker's freedom to leave the programme. After that period the migrant gets access to permanent residence or has to leave.

Which countries did Ruhs study?

He built indexes for labour immigration programmes in 46 high- and middle-income countries, including most of western Europe (Spain among them), North America, the Gulf states and East Asian economies such as Singapore, Japan and Korea, and added case studies of policymaking in major receiving and sending countries.

Where does Martin Ruhs work now?

He is a professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence and deputy director of its Migration Policy Centre. He was previously Professor of Political Economy at the University of Oxford, where he wrote the book.

Sources

  1. The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration. Princeton University Press (2013)
  2. The Price of Rights, Chapter 1: The Rights of Migrant Workers. Reframing the Debate. Princeton University Press (2013)
  3. The ethical case for guest workers. Inside Story (2013)
  4. Martin Ruhs. Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute (2026)
  5. Single Permit Directive. Recast: 2022/0131(COD), summary of the final act. European Parliament, Legislative Observatory (2024)
  6. EU Blue Card: attracting highly qualified talent to the EU. European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs (2026)

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