MigrationProposal

A state in control of immigration: deciding who comes in, how, when and when they leave

Spain lets people in through arraigo two years late and returns few of those told to leave. A yearly plan by channel, voted in parliament, and fast decisions.

Comic illustration: on the harbour quay, Carmen stands with a ballot, Theo points with a notebook and Lucía lifts a key beside a canal lock with one gate shut and one swinging open, worked by a big gold control wheel, while a paper monster looms behind.

In short

A state controls immigration when it decides openly who can come in through each channel, with which rights, and acts quickly on every application and every refusal. The radical-centre proposal for Spain is a yearly migration plan by channel, voted in the Cortes, that publishes numbers, rights and conditions, following Martin Ruhs's finding that admission and rights trade off against each other. It pairs full labour rights and a path to settlement with fast asylum decisions, returns that actually happen and enforcement against employers who hire off the books, inside the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

Key points

  • Martin Ruhs's The Price of Rights (Princeton University Press, 2013) studies labour immigration policy in over forty countries and finds that high-income countries trade the number of lower-skilled migrants they admit against the rights they grant them.
  • Spain's seasonal GECCO programme brought in 25,767 workers from 17 countries in 2025, 92% of them women, under four-year circular permits of up to nine months a year.
  • The new immigration regulation (Real Decreto 1155/2024, in force since May 2025) sets five types of arraigo and cuts the required stay to two years, except for family arraigo.
  • In 2025 EU countries issued 491,950 orders to leave and returned 135,460 people to a third country; Spain issued 53,700 of those orders.
  • Our proposal: a yearly plan by channel voted in the Cortes, full labour rights in every channel, fast decisions on asylum and on returns, and labour inspection aimed at irregular hiring.

At the launch of Democracia 21 in Madrid on 10 October 2026, Miriam González asked for an immigration policy that treats newcomers as an asset for Spain and, at the same time, decides who comes in, how and when, and when they leave if they have to, as Infobae reported. Our overview of her proposals flagged this as one of the hardest to turn into policy. This piece sets out the radical-centre design for the control half, which is also what makes the asset half believable to voters.

The price Ruhs put on rights

Martin Ruhs, in The Price of Rights (Princeton University Press, 2013), looked at labour immigration policies in more than forty countries. His finding, as the publisher summarises it, is that among high-income countries stronger rights for migrants after admission go together with stricter admission rules, and the effect is sharpest for lower-skilled workers. Development agencies want more open labour migration and rights advocates want equal rights, and Ruhs argues that "you cannot always have both." His own answer is temporary programmes with a universal set of core rights for every migrant worker and limits on a small number of specific rights that impose net costs on the receiving country.

People can argue about where he draws that line. His real contribution is to show that every country draws it somewhere, usually without saying so. Spain does it every year.

What Spain already does, quietly

The seasonal programme, the gestión colectiva de contrataciones en origen (GECCO), is the clearest case. The 2026 order, Orden ISM/1547/2025, follows a 2025 campaign that brought 25,767 workers from 17 countries, 92% of them women, mostly to farms in 21 provinces. Circular permits last four years, allow up to nine months of work a year on a fixed-discontinuous contract, require the worker to go home at the end of each season and oblige the employer to provide housing. That is Ruhs's trade-off in miniature: entry is easier because residence is bounded.

For ordinary jobs, the door is the catálogo de ocupaciones de difícil cobertura, which the public employment service draws up every quarter for each province after consulting the tripartite labour commission on immigration. The list for the third quarter of 2026 is almost entirely merchant navy crews, professional athletes and coaches, with a few trades such as crane operators and electricians in some provinces. On paper, the front door for a care worker, a cook or a builder is barely open.

So much of Spain's labour migration arrives another way and gets papers later through arraigo. The new immigration regulation, Real Decreto 1155/2024, in force since May 2025, sets five types of arraigo and cuts the required stay to two years for all but family arraigo. Its preamble says the aim is to favour access to documented status. That is humane and practical, and it also means the main route into the Spanish labour market runs through two years of irregular life, usually in the informal economy.

Asylum carries the rest. The Oficina de Asilo y Refugio resolved a record 160,951 cases in 2025, up 67.2%, against 144,396 new applications. Refugee status and subsidiary protection together were granted in 11.2% of decisions, while 57,334 people, mostly Venezuelans, received humanitarian residence. And at the other end, Eurostat counts 491,950 orders to leave issued across the EU in 2025 and 135,460 people returned to a third country; Spain issued 53,700 of those orders, the third-highest figure. A rule enforced in a minority of cases tells everyone it is optional.

Hein de Haas's research adds the last piece. His DEMIG project, as the European Research Council summarises it, found that most migration policies select who can migrate more than they set how many, that restrictions push people to new routes, legal or irregular, and that they can interrupt circulation and turn temporary migrants into settlers. Control works through channels and timing.

The design we propose

Every autumn, alongside the budget, the government sends the Cortes a migration plan by channel, from seasonal work and employer-sponsored jobs to study, family and asylum resettlement. For each channel it states a range of admissions, the rights attached, the conditions and the point at which a person can settle for good. Congress debates and votes it. The following year's plan opens with what actually happened in each channel, and each channel goes through our five-column test, including who implements it and how we will know it worked. Ruhs's trade-off becomes a table that anyone can read and argue with, and the choice about how open each door is becomes a democratic one.

Some rights sit outside the trade-off. Every legal channel carries full labour rights from the first day: the collective agreement, the minimum wage, Social Security and the right to change employer within the sector. The stable channels lead to long-term residence on a fixed timetable, written into the plan.

Speed is where control lives. A clear asylum case should be decided in a few months, with a judicial appeal on a fixed calendar, and the 2025 figures show the office can raise its output fast. A refusal should lead to departure while the person is still reachable, with assisted voluntary return offered first and enforced return behind it. Return cooperation with countries of origin goes in the same package as seasonal and circular quotas for their citizens. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, in application since June 2026, supplies the European frame: screening at the external border, a mandatory border procedure for applicants unlikely to need protection, returns with reintegration support and a solidarity pool where each state chooses how to contribute.

Enforcement inside the country aims at employers. The labour inspectorate gets a target and the staff to pursue irregular hiring, with fines that cost more than the saving. The worker who reports it gets protection: the regulation already grants an authorisation to someone who proves six months of irregular work within two years before a labour or judicial authority, and the plan should make that route quick and well known.

Then the front door widens. A catálogo built on real vacancies, including care, construction and any other job where vacancy data shows a shortage, turns many future arraigo cases into ordinary visas issued before travel. Arraigo stays as a safety valve and the plan reports each year how many people still needed it, which is the best single measure of whether the legal routes are working.

The left's case for full labour rights and a path to settlement, the right's case for rules that are enforced, returns included, and Ruhs's insistence on naming the trade-off add up to one position here. A state that publishes its plan and decides quickly in both directions can afford to be generous with the doors it opens, because people can see the doors close when they are meant to. The first plan could go to the Cortes with the 2027 budget, and the GECCO figures and the Eurostat return series already give it a baseline.

Questions and answers

What does it mean for a state to control immigration?

It means the state decides in advance, and in public, who can come in through each channel, with which rights and for how long, and then applies those decisions quickly, including returning people whose application has been refused. Control in this sense depends on speed and on legal routes that people actually use.

What is Martin Ruhs's numbers versus rights trade-off?

In The Price of Rights, Martin Ruhs finds that in high-income countries, more rights for migrant workers after admission tend to come with stricter admission rules, especially for lower-skilled workers. He proposes temporary programmes that guarantee a universal set of core rights while restricting a few specific rights that create net costs for the receiving country.

What is arraigo in Spain?

Arraigo is the route by which a foreign national already living in Spain without papers can obtain residence, usually after a set period of stay plus a job offer, training or proof of integration. Since May 2025, Real Decreto 1155/2024 provides five types (social, sociolaboral, socioformativo, family and second chance) and a two-year stay for most of them.

How many return orders does Spain carry out?

Eurostat reports that EU countries issued 491,950 orders to leave in 2025 and returned 135,460 third-country nationals to a third country. Spain issued 53,700 orders, the third-highest figure in the EU. Across the EU, returns ran at well under a third of the orders issued that year.

Sources

  1. The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration. Princeton University Press (2013)
  2. Democracia 21, el nuevo partido de Miriam González que busca romper los «dos bloques férreos» del bipartidismo. Infobae (2026)
  3. Real Decreto 1155/2024, de 19 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000. Boletín Oficial del Estado (2024)
  4. El Gobierno aprueba la Orden GECCO 2026 para la contratación de personas extranjeras en origen y migración circular. La Moncloa (2025)
  5. Balance de la Oficina de Asilo y Refugio 2025. La Moncloa (2026)
  6. Enforcement of immigration legislation statistics. Eurostat (2026)

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