Ideas & historyInterpretation

Carens vs Miller: open borders or communities that decide?

The open-borders philosopher and the self-determination philosopher agree on one thing: years lived in a place make you a member. Spain can build on it.

Comic illustration: at the Lighthouse, Lucía waves holding a book and Theo stands with a magnifier beside a low red brick wall whose teal garden gate swings half open on bright gold hinges, a pale path leading through it.

In short

Joseph Carens, in The Ethics of Immigration (2013), defends open borders and calls birthright citizenship a kind of feudal privilege; David Miller, in Strangers in Our Midst (2016), defends the right of democratic communities to decide who joins them. They meet on social membership: Miller himself calls Carens's argument the most persuasive case for giving permanent residence and access to citizenship to anyone who has lived in a country long enough. The radical-centre position is to build the rules on that shared ground, with a fixed, short and predictable path from residence to rights and citizenship, and to argue in the open about how many people come in.

Key points

  • Joseph Carens's The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2013) first grants that states may control admissions and shows that anyone who has lived in a country for several years still has a moral claim to citizenship; then it argues for open borders.
  • Carens says restricting movement by citizenship turns birthright citizenship into a feudal class privilege, because opportunities then depend on a status assigned at birth.
  • David Miller's Strangers in Our Midst (Harvard University Press, 2016) defends democratic self-determination over future membership, within a weak cosmopolitanism that requires respect for human rights, relevant reasons for refusals and fair treatment of refugees as the first priority.
  • Miller endorses Carens's social membership argument for giving permanent residence and access to citizenship after enough time, with a conditional amnesty for irregular migrants.
  • In Spain, arraigo needs two years in the country, nationality needs ten years of legal residence (two for Ibero-Americans), and EU long-term resident status needs five. The radical-centre proposal is one clock for everyone.

Joseph Carens and David Miller are the two names most students of immigration ethics meet first, and they are usually set up as the two ends of the debate. Carens, in The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2013), makes the best-known philosophical case for open borders. Miller, in Strangers in Our Midst (Harvard University Press, 2016), makes the best-known case that democratic communities may decide who joins them. Read closely, the two books share a piece of ground, and Spain could build a good part of its immigration law on it. Migration is one of the problems Miriam González put on the table at the launch of Democracia 21, which we mapped in our overview.

Carens: birth as privilege, residence as membership

Carens writes his book in two halves, and the first is the one that matters most for policy. As Arash Abizadeh explains in his review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Carens provisionally accepts the conventional view that states are entitled to considerable discretion over who they admit. His key idea is the social membership norm: the moral claim to citizenship rests on a person's embeddedness in a dense network of relationships and associations in a society. He finds the norm already at work in birthright citizenship, which we give children because we expect them to grow up as members. Migrants build the same network over time. So anyone who has lived in a state for several years, with or without permission, has a moral claim to citizenship. Carens rejects most of the usual conditions: renouncing another nationality, proving good character, showing sufficient funds, passing civic tests. Only a criminal record serious enough to justify deportation defeats the claim. He also wants a firewall, so that a migrant who goes to a doctor is not handed over to immigration enforcement.

The second half drops the concession and argues for a human right to move across borders. The main argument is autonomy, and he borrows a line of reasoning from Miller himself: the reasons that make freedom of movement inside a country a basic right apply between countries too. The second argument is equality of opportunity. Tying access to opportunity to citizenship makes life chances depend on a status handed out at birth, which, in Carens's phrase, turns birthright citizenship into a "feudal class privilege".

Miller: self-determination, with duties attached

Miller summarised his own book in a 2017 overview. He starts by rejecting strong cosmopolitanism: a political community may give more weight to its members' interests, because shared membership creates special obligations. He accepts a weak cosmopolitan premise, the equal moral worth of every human being, which means respecting human rights and giving relevant reasons whenever a state withholds something beyond them. He takes on the open-borders arguments directly, and against global equality of opportunity he answers that there is no common measure for comparing opportunities across countries and no global agent responsible for creating them. His positive case is democratic: collective self-determination includes deciding on the future membership of the demos, and nobody can plan schools, housing or energy without knowing how many people they are planning for.

The duties he attaches are real. Refugees, defined broadly as people whose human rights can only be protected by crossing a border, come first, and the book ends by saying their fair treatment must be the first priority of any defensible regime; states may share that burden through international schemes. Economic migrants are admitted for mutual advantage, temporary programmes are acceptable if they are fixed-term and properly regulated, race is never a relevant reason to refuse anyone, and recruitment that drains poor countries of the people they need is out. Aurélien Allard, reviewing the book for La Vie des idées, stresses the reciprocity: migrants who stay should have the same rights as citizens, social and political ones included, and the state may ask them in return to learn the language and the political culture. Miller defends citizenship tests on condition they are not excessively demanding, and says nobody should be obliged to naturalise.

The shared ground, applied to Spain

Here is the meeting point. In that same overview Miller calls Carens's social membership argument the most persuasive justification for giving permanent residence and access to citizenship to everyone physically present for long enough, and for irregular migrants he accepts a conditional amnesty. The open-borders philosopher and the self-determination philosopher agree that time and participation turn a newcomer into a member. Their disagreements are about the door, how many come in and under what selection, and about how demanding the conditions on the way to citizenship should be.

Spain already runs on both ideas, in pieces. The immigration regulation approved by Royal Decree 1155/2024, in force since 20 May 2025, grants residence through arraigo after two years of continuous presence in the country (family arraigo needs no minimum), to people with no criminal record and, depending on the route, a job contract of at least twenty hours a week at the minimum wage or family ties and means of at least 100% of the IPREM. That is Carens's insight written into law. Then the clock changes. Article 22 of the Civil Code asks for ten years of legal, continuous residence before nationality, five for refugees, two for nationals of Ibero-American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Portugal and for Sephardic Jews, plus good civic conduct and a sufficient degree of integration. The years spent without papers do not count. At European level, Directive 2003/109/EC gives long-term resident status, with equal treatment in employment, education and other fields, after five years of legal, uninterrupted residence, and lets states require integration measures.

Take two people who work side by side in the same greenhouse in Almería, one born in Peru and one in Senegal. The first can apply for nationality after two years of legal residence, the second after ten. Carens would recognise that as birthplace deciding life chances, and Miller's weak cosmopolitanism asks for a relevant reason that is hard to find.

The radical-centre position takes the left's point from Carens, that years lived and worked in a place earn membership whatever passport you were born with, and the liberal point from Miller, that a democracy chooses its future members and can ask for integration in return for equal rights. It builds the law on what they share. One published clock: arraigo at two years, EU long-term status at five, with the two years before arraigo counting towards it, and nationality at five years of legal residence for everyone, keeping the shorter periods Spain grants for historic ties, after a language and civics test of moderate difficulty with free classes to prepare for it. Each step is a right once the conditions are met, decided within a fixed deadline. The argument about how many people come in each year, and through which channels, belongs in the Cortes, in public, with numbers that schools and housing can plan around. Miller asks for exactly that, and Carens, writing inside the conventional view, gives the state that room.

Questions and answers

What is the difference between Joseph Carens and David Miller on immigration?

Carens argues that there is a human right to move across borders and that restricting it by citizenship makes life chances depend on birth. Miller argues that democratic communities have a right to decide on their future membership, limited by human rights, by duties to refugees and by the need to give relevant reasons when they refuse someone.

What is Carens's social membership argument?

It holds that the moral claim to citizenship rests on social membership, the dense web of relationships and associations a person builds in a society. Because migrants build that web over time, anyone who has lived in a state for several years, with or without authorisation, has a moral claim to the status and rights of citizenship.

Does David Miller support amnesty for irregular migrants?

In a conditional form, yes. In his own overview of Strangers in Our Midst he defends Carens's social membership argument as the most persuasive reason to give permanent residence and access to citizenship to everyone physically present for long enough, and says that for irregular migrants this could mean a conditional amnesty.

How long does it take to become a Spanish citizen?

Article 22 of the Civil Code requires ten years of legal, continuous residence, five for recognised refugees and two for nationals of Ibero-American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Portugal and for Sephardic Jews. One year is enough for people born in Spain or married to a Spaniard for a year. Applicants must also show good civic conduct and a sufficient degree of integration.

Sources

  1. The Ethics of Immigration (review by Arash Abizadeh). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014)
  2. Strangers in Our Midst: an overview. David Miller, Oxford University Research Archive (2017)
  3. The Great Wall of Britain (review of Strangers in Our Midst by Aurélien Allard). La Vie des idées (2017)
  4. Código Civil, artículo 22 (nacionalidad por residencia). Boletín Oficial del Estado (1889)
  5. Real Decreto 1155/2024, Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000 sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros. Boletín Oficial del Estado (2024)
  6. Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. Official Journal of the European Union (BOE copy) (2003)

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