MigrationInterpretation
Hein de Haas's How Migration Really Works explained: labour, borders and 22 myths
Development raises emigration, jobs pull people in, and visas change the route more than the number. Hein de Haas's 22 migration myths, applied to Spain.
In short
In How Migration Really Works (2023), the sociologist Hein de Haas argues that migration is an intrinsic part of development, that labour demand in destination countries is its main driver, and that most migrants arrive legally. Border restrictions mostly change the routes people take and the timing of their moves, and they discourage return, so migrants who would have come and gone settle for good. He finds myths on both sides: the left believes aid will keep people at home, the right believes migration works like a tap. For Spain, where one resident in five was born abroad, the lesson is to manage the channels the labour market already opens.
Key points
- De Haas calls the idea that development in poor countries will reduce migration the biggest left-wing myth: rising incomes and schooling raise both the ability and the wish to move, and middle-income countries have the highest emigration rates.
- Labour demand is the main pull. About 9 in 10 Africans who go to Europe do so legally, and most people working illegally arrived with a visa and stayed.
- His team analysed 6,500 migration policies across Europe and North America and found no significant difference between left- and right-wing governments.
- Spain's 1991 visas for Moroccans ended a circular pattern of coming and going; the Moroccan-born population has grown from about 107,000 in 1991 to an estimated 1.2 million.
- On 1 October 2026 Spain had 49,935,642 residents, 10,433,091 of them born abroad, and the foreign-born accounted for 98.8% of the quarter's population growth (INE).
Hein de Haas has spent more than three decades researching migration, much of it in Morocco, and How Migration Really Works (Penguin, 2023) is his attempt to hand that research to everyone who argues about the subject. The book takes 22 popular beliefs about migration and checks each one against the evidence. In Spain it came out in May 2024 with Península as Los mitos de la inmigración, translated by Juanjo Estrella González. It is the right place to start a week on immigration, because the speech that launched Democracia 21, which we analysed in our overview, asked for two things in the same breath: immigration treated as an asset for Spain, and a state in control of who comes in, how, when and when they leave. De Haas tells us what each half of that sentence can actually deliver.
The opening myths are about scale. Penguin's page for the book leads with the finding that global migration is not at an all-time high, and with a more provocative one: border restrictions have actually produced more migration. De Haas has been publishing short summaries of the 22 chapters on his Substack since September 2026, and the first titles give the flavour: unprecedented mass migration, borders beyond control, an unprecedented refugee crisis, societies more diverse than ever.
Development and jobs move people
The fifth myth is the one he calls the biggest on the left: the idea that aid, trade and growth in poor countries will tackle the root causes and keep people at home. De Haas finds that emigration tends to rise as poor countries get richer. Higher incomes, schooling, roads and media exposure give people both the means and the aspiration to move, and moving is expensive, so the very poorest travel short distances or stay put. That is why middle-income countries usually have the highest emigration rates. He calls it the migration paradox, and he asks us to see migration as an intrinsic part of development.
Morocco is his own long case. Since his first visit in 1987 he has watched living standards double, poverty fall, literacy rise and birth rates drop, and emigration to Spain and the rest of Europe kept rising all the same. Moroccans abroad sent home about €11 billion in 2023, fifteen times the official development aid the country receives.
What pulls people is work in the destination country. De Haas notes that the great majority of migrants arrive legally: of all the Africans who leave for Europe, roughly nine in ten do so legally, and most people working illegally came with a visa and stayed. Migrants fill labour shortages, which disposes of the claim that they steal jobs. In Spain, an ageing population and rising education levels have opened gaps in agriculture, construction, cleaning, care, hospitality, the food industry and delivery, and undocumented workers are widely tolerated in those jobs because workplace enforcement is weak. The pattern follows the business cycle closely: during the 2008–2014 crisis immigration from Morocco plummeted, and it rebounded only when the economy picked up again.
What borders change
The right has its own myths, and the central one is that migration works like a tap that governments can turn on and off. De Haas adds that right-wing parties talk tough and then act much softer, because they are heavily influenced by business lobbies that want workers, and in practice they tolerate exploitation. The left once opposed immigration on class grounds, with unions seeing cheap foreign labour as a threat to native workers. When his team at Oxford analysed 6,500 migration policies across Europe and North America, they found no significant difference between left- and right-wing governments.
Borders still matter a great deal, and de Haas is precise about how. Before 1991 Moroccans could take the ferry to Spain, work for a season and go home. Spain introduced visas that year within the Schengen framework, just as Spanish and Italian demand for labour was growing. People kept coming, now through smugglers, illegal crossings and overstayed visas, and because returning had become costly, those who would have circulated settled. De Haas puts the dilemma in a single line: "The harder it is to come, the more migrants stay." Restrictions also produce now-or-never rushes whenever a door opens. The Moroccan-born population of Spain has grown from about 107,000 in 1991 to an estimated 1.2 million. On Spain's regularisation and the fear of an efecto llamada, he judges the evidence for a pull effect weak and inconclusive; labour shortages are the far bigger pull.
He wrote that analysis in September 2026, after the latest Ceuta border crisis, which he calls self-inflicted. He rejects both closed and open borders as slogans. His prescription is an honest debate on closing the gap between labour demand and legal routes, through deeper economic and labour market reforms, more legal channels, or a combination of both, and he says it takes political courage. He also warns against treating migrants as a convenient, expandable workforce that cares for our elderly, and asks governments to plan for the long-term effects, above all on the second generation.
The Spanish numbers show the size of the stakes. According to the INE, on 1 October 2026 Spain had 49,935,642 residents, 10,433,091 of them born abroad, about one in five. People with foreign nationality numbered 7,518,237; the difference is mostly people who have acquired Spanish nationality. And 98.8% of the quarter's population growth came from the foreign-born.
For the radical centre the book supplies the method for the week. The left is right that migrants come because employers and governments create the jobs that draw them, so their rights and working conditions belong inside migration policy, and tolerated irregular work is a policy choice. The liberal and conservative tradition is right that a state can choose its rules and should enforce them, and de Haas confirms that border rules really do reshape flows. What neither camp quite says is that migration is a normal part of development and of labour markets, so policy works on channels and timing. Put together, that gives Spain a clear line: open legal channels that match the jobs already pulling people in, enforce labour law in the workplaces where irregular work is tolerated today, keep circular movement possible so people can go home and come back, and tell voters the honest promise, which is management. That is how Democracia 21's asset and control fit in one policy, and it is the ground on which Yascha Mounk's case for diverse democracies can be built.
Questions and answers
What is How Migration Really Works by Hein de Haas about?
It tests 22 common beliefs about migration against three decades of research. De Haas argues that migration grows with development, that labour demand is its main driver, that most migrants arrive legally, and that border restrictions change routes and timing more than they reduce numbers. The Spanish edition is Los mitos de la inmigración (Península, 2024).
Does development in poor countries reduce migration?
In the short to medium term, de Haas finds the opposite. Higher incomes, education, roads and media exposure give people the means and the aspiration to move, which is why middle-income countries usually have the highest emigration rates. He calls this the migration paradox.
Do border controls reduce migration, according to de Haas?
They mostly change how and when people move. Restrictions push people towards smugglers and visa overstays, make return costly so temporary migrants settle, and cause now-or-never rushes whenever a door seems about to close or opens briefly.
Which migration myths do left and right believe?
He names the left's belief that aid and development will keep people at home, and the right's belief that migration can be turned on and off like a tap, along with the ideas of an invasion and of migrants stealing jobs. He also notes that tough-talking right-wing governments often tolerate irregular work under pressure from business.
Sources
- How Migration Really Works: 22 things you need to know about the most divisive issue in politics. Penguin Books (2024)
- Los mitos de la inmigración: 22 falsos mantras sobre el tema que más nos divide. Ediciones Península (2024)
- Migration myth 5/22: Development in poor countries will reduce migration. Hein de Haas (Substack) (2026)
- The left and right have failed us on migration. Hein de Haas (Substack) (2025)
- Spain's self-inflicted migration crisis. Hein de Haas (Substack) (2026)
- Estadística Continua de Población (ECP). 1 de octubre de 2026. Datos provisionales. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2026)