# The five-column policy test: an exercise for checking whether any public policy can work

> The five-column test checks whether a policy can work by filling in five boxes: the goal, who decides, who implements, who can veto and how we will know it worked. A policy is ready when every column holds a named actor, a date or a measure. Applied to three of Democracia 21's institutional proposals, it shows the 90% cut in advisers is weakest on durability, independent watchdogs on vetoes, and fortnightly constituency visits on measurement.

- URL: https://www.radicalcentre.eu/en/articles/five-column-policy-test-exercise
- Language: en
- Publisher: radical centre / centro radical
- Published: 2026-10-26
- Topic: Democracy & institutions
- Author: radical centre
- Licence: CC BY 4.0

## Key points

- The five columns are: goal, who decides, who implements, who can veto, and how we know it worked.
- Jennifer Pahlka's Recoding America supplies the implementation column, Marc Dunkelman's Why Nothing Works the veto column, and Francis Fukuyama's three pillars of state, rule of law and accountability the frame for the whole test.
- The UK Treasury's Magenta Book asks for evaluation to be planned from the earliest stage of a policy; Spain's AIReF spending reviews and the Dutch CPB's costing of manifestos show the fifth column working in Europe.
- Tested on Democracia 21's proposals, the advisers cut needs a law to last, independent watchdogs need deadlines on vetoes, and fortnightly MP visits need a measure beyond attendance.
- We propose that every party publishes the five columns for its flagship pledges.

Every manifesto pledge states a goal. Far fewer say who will carry it out, who can stop it and how anyone will know it worked. This week's exercise fixes that with a simple sheet of paper and five columns:

**Goal | Who decides? | Who implements? | Who can veto? | How do we know it worked?**

A policy is ready when every column holds a name, a date or a measure. A column you can't fill marks the place where the policy will break. Tomorrow we run all ten problems from Miriam González's launch speech for [Democracia 21](/en/articles/democracia-21-miriam-gonzalez-proposals-radical-centre) through the test. Today we explain the method and work through three of her institutional proposals in full.

## Where each column comes from

The frame is Francis Fukuyama's. In *Political Order and Political Decay*, as Branko Milanovic's review puts it, good governance stands on three pillars: a strong state, the rule of law and accountability. A policy usually aims at one of them and quietly depends on the other two. The five columns make that dependence visible. We covered the book in our [Fukuyama explainer](/en/articles/fukuyama-political-order-and-political-decay-explained).

**Goal.** Write it as a change a citizen would notice, with a number or a date if possible, such as every watchdog appointed on time.

**Who decides?** One named authority with the legal power to make the decision: parliament by law, the Council of Ministers by decree, a minister by order. Clear responsibility makes the rest of the sheet possible, and voters know whom to reward or blame.

**Who implements?** This is Jennifer Pahlka's column. *Recoding America* is about what happens after a law is passed, and we explained it [here](/en/articles/jennifer-pahlka-recoding-america-explained). Rebecca Tushnet's review in JOTWELL describes Pahlka's diagnosis: rules flow down a hierarchy like water over a fall, each layer applies them more rigidly than the one above, and the people at the bottom are judged on compliance. Her remedies are practical. Launch early, improve as you learn, judge teams by what user testing shows, and pay for the operational staff who run programmes. So the column asks for a specific unit, its people, its systems and its deadline.

**Who can veto?** Marc Dunkelman's column. His *Why Nothing Works*, summarised by Brown University's Watson School, describes a vetocracy where nearly anyone can stifle progress, and traces part of it to reformers who put boxing government in ahead of using it. Fukuyama's own list of American ills, in Milanovic's reading, includes too many veto players. Write down every actor who can stop the policy: courts, the other chamber, regions, unions, a qualified majority, the next government. Then ask whether each veto has a deadline. Our [vetocracy explainer](/en/articles/what-is-vetocracy-fukuyama-dunkelman) and [Dunkelman explainer](/en/articles/marc-dunkelman-why-nothing-works-explained) go deeper.

**How do we know it worked?** Europe already does this well. The UK Treasury's Magenta Book, its guidance on evaluation, says evaluation belongs in a policy's design and delivery from the earliest stages; its May 2026 update added guidance on test and learn. In Spain, the Council of Ministers commissions spending reviews from AIReF, the independent fiscal authority. The 2022–2026 cycle was approved in December 2021; the second phase, covering the minimum income, temporary sick leave and development aid, delivered its final reports in February 2026, and in April 2026 the government added employment policies and part of the European regional fund. In the Netherlands, the CPB has costed party manifestos with one common method since 1986, through its *Charted Choices* series, for parties that choose to take part. Our pieces on [comparing real alternatives](/en/articles/compare-real-alternatives-impact-assessment-proposal) and on [policy pilots](/en/articles/policy-pilots-spain-experiment-first) set out how Spain can do more of this.

## Three proposals, column by column

**Cut 90% of advisers.** The Objective reported González's promise to cut 90% of the government's advisers.

| Column | Answer |
|---|---|
| Goal | Far fewer political appointees, with technical work done by career staff |
| Who decides? | Open in the coverage: a decree by the next government or a law |
| Who implements? | Each ministry and the Civil Service, which must absorb the work |
| Who can veto? | Almost nobody today; the following government, which can rehire overnight |
| How do we know? | Published headcount by ministry, every year |

The first four columns fill quickly. The veto column shows the risk: a cut made by one cabinet's decision can be undone by the next cabinet's. The fix is a cap written in law, as our piece on [merit and advisers](/en/articles/merit-spain-administration-cut-advisers) proposes, plus a fifth-column measure on whether the work actually moved to civil servants.

**Oversight bodies without politicians or ex-politicians.** As our overview of the speech records, González wants the bodies that control the government freed from politicians and former politicians.

| Column | Answer |
|---|---|
| Goal | Watchdogs appointed on merit, on time, and trusted across parties |
| Who decides? | Parliament, usually by qualified majority |
| Who implements? | A selection panel and the bodies themselves |
| Who can veto? | Either large bloc, by withholding the qualified majority |
| How do we know? | Appointments made on time; annual reports; external peer review |

Here the veto column carries the weight. Spain's long freeze of the judges' council showed what a blocked majority does. Our proposal for [oversight bodies](/en/articles/oversight-bodies-without-politicians-spain-proposal) adds a deadline and a default: after three months, the panel's top candidate takes the post.

**MPs back in their constituency every two weeks.** The Objective reported the plan to make MPs return to their constituencies every fortnight to do their job.

| Column | Answer |
|---|---|
| Goal | Deputies who answer to their voters |
| Who decides? | Congress, through its calendar and rules, and the parties |
| Who implements? | Each deputy and party group |
| Who can veto? | The party, which controls the list and so the deputy's career |
| How do we know? | Attendance is easy to count; influence on what the deputy does is harder |

This one fails on the fifth column. A visit counted is an output. To know it worked, the record has to show which questions and amendments came from those meetings, and voters need a way to act on it. Our piece on [MPs who go home](/en/articles/mps-who-go-home-lists-districts-accountability) suggests a preference vote and a public log.

## What the test asks of every party

The left brings the purpose: policy exists to reach public goals, and citizens are owed an account of whether it did. The right and the liberal market tradition bring the discipline of one responsible decision-maker and as few veto points as the goal allows. The idea that belongs to neither camp is the test itself: delivery and measurement designed in before the announcement, so they become part of the proposal. A pledge with an empty third or fifth column is still a slogan.

Our proposal is modest and open to anyone. Every party standing on 29 November could publish the five columns for its five flagship pledges, in the spirit of the Dutch manifesto costings, and AIReF could check them against what happened a year after the election. Tomorrow the other seven problems from the speech get the same sheet.

## FAQ

### What is the five-column policy test?

A one-page check for any proposal. You write its goal, who has the power to decide it, who will carry it out, who can block it, and what evidence will show whether it worked. A column you can't fill points to where the policy will fail.

### How do you know if a public policy will work?

Check delivery and evidence before launch. Name the unit that will implement it and its means, list every actor who can stop it and how long they have, and set the measure and the evaluator in advance, as the UK Magenta Book recommends.

### Who evaluates public policies in Spain?

AIReF, the independent fiscal authority, carries out spending reviews commissioned by the Council of Ministers. The 2022–2026 cycle has covered areas such as the minimum income, temporary sick leave, development aid and employment policies.

### Will the five columns be applied to all of Democracia 21's proposals?

Yes. Day 14 of our programme applies the test to all ten problems from the 10 October 2026 speech. This piece explains the method and works through three cases.

## Sources

- [Miriam González lanza Democracia 21](https://theobjective.com/espana/politica/2026-10-10/miriam-gonzalez-democracia-politica/), The Objective (2026)
- [Recoding America (review by Rebecca Tushnet)](https://cyber.jotwell.com/?p=2696), JOTWELL
- [Why Nothing Works (research brief)](https://home.watson.brown.edu/research/research-briefs/why-nothing-works), Watson School, Brown University (2025)
- [Political Decay in Our Time: A review of Fukuyama's vol. 2](https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/04/12/2019/political-decay-our-time-review-fukuyamas-vol-2), Global Policy Journal (Branko Milanovic) (2019)
- [The Magenta Book](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-magenta-book), HM Treasury and Evaluation Task Force (2026)
- [El Gobierno formaliza la tercera fase del Spending Review 2022-2026](https://www.hacienda.gob.es/es-ES/Prensa/Noticias/Paginas/2026/20260421-NP-CM-SPENDING-REVIEW.aspx), Ministerio de Hacienda (2026)