# David Miller's Strangers in Our Midst explained: self-determination, refugees and integration

> David Miller's Strangers in Our Midst (Harvard University Press, 2016) argues that democratic communities may control immigration and select migrants, because self-determination includes deciding who joins the people and because housing, schools and energy cannot be planned without knowing the numbers. That right comes with duties: respect for everyone's human rights, relevant reasons for every refusal, refugees as the first priority, fixed-term rules for temporary workers, and a path to residence and citizenship for people who have lived in the country long enough. The radical-centre reading uses Miller to make control legitimate in Spain: numbers decided in public, refugees protected first, and integration asked for in its social and civic forms.

- URL: https://www.radicalcentre.eu/en/articles/david-miller-strangers-in-our-midst-explained
- Language: en
- Publisher: radical centre / centro radical
- Published: 2026-11-16
- Topic: Ideas & history
- Author: radical centre
- Licence: CC BY 4.0

## Key points

- David Miller's Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration (Harvard University Press, 2016) treats immigration as a question about self-determination, social justice and cultural identity, beyond economics or human rights alone.
- Miller accepts a weak cosmopolitanism: equal moral worth means respecting human rights and giving relevant reasons when a state refuses someone.
- He defines refugees as people whose human rights can only be protected by crossing a border, accepts international burden-sharing, and ends the book saying fair treatment of refugees must come first.
- He endorses Joseph Carens's social membership argument for permanent residence and access to citizenship after enough time, including a conditional amnesty for irregular migrants.
- He distinguishes social, civic and cultural integration and defends citizenship tests that are not excessively demanding, like Spain's 25-question CCSE.

David Miller, a political theorist at Nuffield College, Oxford, published Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration with Harvard University Press in 2016. It is the most careful philosophical defence of a democracy's right to decide who joins it, and it is often filed under "restrictionist", which hides how many duties Miller attaches to that right. Reading it closely is useful for anyone in Spain who wants immigration control that people on both sides can accept as fair. We set Miller against Joseph Carens [in an earlier piece](/en/articles/carens-vs-miller-open-borders-or-communities-that-decide) and explain [Carens's own book here](/en/articles/joseph-carens-the-ethics-of-immigration-explained); this one walks through Miller's. Migration is one of the problems Miriam González raised at the launch of Democracia 21, which we mapped in [our overview](/en/articles/democracia-21-miriam-gonzalez-proposals-radical-centre).

Miller wrote a short overview of the book in 2017, and it is the clearest guide to its structure. He says he conceived it well before the 2015 migration crisis, and that he deliberately sets aside two common ways of talking about immigration. One treats it as an economic ledger of winners and losers, which he finds finely balanced and blind to the long-run social and political effects. The other treats it purely as a matter of human rights, often read expansively. Miller wants immigration treated as a central topic of political philosophy: legitimacy, territory, self-determination, social justice and cultural identity, alongside global justice.

## The right to choose, and its limits

The starting point is partiality. A political community may give more weight to its members' interests than to outsiders', because shared membership creates associative obligations, the way family or friendship does. Miller rejects strong cosmopolitanism. He accepts a weak version: every human being has equal moral worth, which he cashes out as two duties. Respect everyone's human rights. And when you withhold something beyond what human rights demand, give the person a relevant reason.

He then takes on the three big arguments for open borders. The earth as common property gives, in his reading, only a right of necessity, access to territory when survival depends on it. Global equality of opportunity fails because there is no common measure for comparing opportunities across countries, and no single global agent responsible for creating them. A human right to immigrate overstretches the right to free movement, which protects basic needs and freedom from arbitrary state interference, and which is already limited inside every country by property and public order.

The positive case is democratic. Territorial jurisdiction implies setting limits on the population over which it is exercised, and a self-governing people must be able to decide on its future membership. Miller adds a planner's point that Spanish readers will recognise: education, housing, energy and the environment cannot be planned coherently without knowing how many people they must serve.

## Who gets in, and on what terms

The second part applies the principles. Refugees are defined broadly, as people whose human rights cannot be protected unless they cross a border, whether because of persecution, state incapacity or prolonged natural disaster. An asylum claim puts a special obligation on the state that receives it, though sanctuary need not always be given there: Miller defends international burden-sharing schemes against the charge of "trading in refugees". He lists four possible criteria for choosing among refugees and allows economic contribution and cultural affinity only under special provisos.

Economic migrants are admitted for mutual advantage, and justice still governs who comes and on what terms. Temporary programmes are defensible against Michael Walzer's charge of tyranny so long as they are fixed-term and properly regulated. Selection by race is ruled out because the refused person is owed a relevant reason. Recruitment that drains poor countries of people they need is ruled out too. For irregular migrants, the state of residence must always protect their human rights, need not grant them full citizenship rights, and Miller is sceptical of Carens's firewall. He does endorse Carens's social membership argument as the most persuasive case for giving permanent residence and access to citizenship to everyone present long enough, with a conditional amnesty for irregulars.

## Integration in three layers

Integration, Miller notes, is invoked everywhere and rarely defined. He separates it into three. Social integration means people interacting in a friendly, respectful way across many settings, and promoting it is a legitimate public aim, for justice and for trust. Civic integration means sharing the principles and norms of political life, and Miller defends citizenship tests as long as they are not excessively demanding, while insisting nobody should be obliged to naturalise. Cultural integration is the most contested; encouraging newcomers to take on the national identity is justifiable if private and public culture are kept apart, and Miller suggests that giving symbolic precedence to a national religion may sometimes be permissible. The book ends by saying the fair treatment of refugees must be the first priority of any defensible regime.

The critics are worth hearing. Aurélien Allard, in La Vie des idées, finds Miller's argument about migrants' differing values too vague, notes that Miller himself admits the evidence on diversity and trust is unsettled and mostly American, and calls the book an enlightened defence of the status quo.

## Miller in Spain

Spain sits close to Miller's design in several places. Its constitution says no faith has state character and asks public authorities to cooperate with the Catholic Church and other confessions, which is the kind of symbolic precedence inside a plural state that Miller describes. Its citizenship test, the Instituto Cervantes CCSE, has 25 questions on the Constitution and on Spanish culture and society, a light civic test of the sort Miller defends.

The radical-centre reading combines Miller's right, the left's duty and the layered integration that belongs to neither tradition. Spain decides in public, every year, how many people it wants through each channel, and plans housing and schools around that figure, which is Miller's democratic case for control. Refugees come first, and Spain joins European burden-sharing as a matter of principle, which is Miller's duty. And integration policy puts its money into the social and civic layers, mixing in schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods and a fair civic test with free classes, while it leaves culture, faith and the language people speak at home to the people themselves.

## FAQ

### What is Strangers in Our Midst about?

It is David Miller's political philosophy of immigration. It argues that a democratic state may favour its members' interests and control who comes in, within limits set by human rights, by duties to refugees and by the requirement to give relevant reasons when it refuses someone.

### What is weak cosmopolitanism?

It is Miller's name for the premise that every human being has equal moral worth, which he turns into two practical duties: respect everyone's human rights, and give relevant reasons whenever you withhold a benefit beyond what human rights require. It rules out, for example, selecting migrants by race.

### What does David Miller say about refugees?

He defines them broadly, as people whose human rights cannot be protected unless they move across a border, because of persecution, state incapacity or prolonged natural disasters. The state that receives an asylum claim has a special obligation, but states may share the burden through international schemes, and refugees' fair treatment must be the first priority of any defensible regime.

### Is David Miller against immigration?

No. He defends a state's right to decide how many and whom to admit, and he accepts economic migration for mutual advantage, temporary programmes under proper regulation and a route to citizenship for long-term residents. His critics, such as Aurélien Allard, read the book as a defence of the status quo.

## Sources

- [Strangers in Our Midst: an overview](https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b2823c28-e4da-4293-a6d8-42fb18c4d0ef/files/md78ab4f1c6e3b498dd219f21203f0e01), David Miller, Oxford University Research Archive (2017)
- [The Great Wall of Britain (review of Strangers in Our Midst by Aurélien Allard)](https://laviedesidees.fr/The-Great-Wall-of-Britain), La Vie des idées (2017)
- [CCSE: preguntas frecuentes](https://www.uv.es/centro-idiomas-uv/es/acreditaciones/ccse/preguntas-frecuentes.html), Centre d'Idiomes, Universitat de València (2026)
- [Constitución Española (texto consolidado)](https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1978-31229), Boletín Oficial del Estado (1978)
